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[T] he practice of arbitrary imprisonments ... [is one of] the fa-
vourite [sic] and most formidable instruments of tyranny.
[The writ of habeas corpus] has also been raised to the importance
and clothed with the power of a political principle, so that while
and because it is an invaluable and incomparable protection for
personal liberty, it is also in turn protected by the highest power in
the state, constitutional and legislative, as a cherished popular right
and safeguard of civil liberty.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, the government has held individu-
als at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO)
based on the government's belief that these individuals (GITMO
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 251 (Alexander Hamilton) (John Stuart Mill
ed., 1952).
2. ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON
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detainees) are "enemy combatants" in the War on Terror.' The
government detains these individuals, but contends that they are
not entitled to prisoner-of-war status or the protections of the Con-
stitution.' The government's actions are part of a "'new kind of
war' in which it can assert all of the powers associated with the laws
of war, but abide by none of its constraints."5
The GITMO detainees have challenged the propriety of their
6detention by filing writs of habeas corpus. Recently, the govern-
ment removed the statutory vehicle that permitted the GITMO de-
tainees to file these writs, eliminating their ability to contest their
detention, unless the Constitution grants the detainees the right to
habeas corpus.' The GITMO detainees have challenged the gov-
ernment's ability to limit their access to the writ of habeas corpus in
Boumediene v. Bush. In previous cases addressing the propriety of
the government's detention of the GITMO detainees, the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether the GITMO detainees are enti-
tled to file writs of habeas corpus as a constitutional right.9 The is-
sue before the Court in Boumediene is whether the GITMO detain-
ees have this constitutional right.'0 The D.C. Circuit concluded
that they did not."
This article addresses the proper resolution of whether the
GITMO detainees possess the constitutional right to challenge
their detention at GITMO via a writ of habeas corpus. Part II ex-
amines the history and usage of the writ of habeas corpus." It con-siders Johnson v. Eisentrager, the case relied upon by the government
3. Robert Barnes, Justices Appear Divided on Detainees' Rights: Guantanamo Pris-
oners Get New Supreme Court Hearing; Independent Review at Issue, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2007, at A03.
4. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 549-51 (2004) (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
5. Kristine A. Huskey, Standards and Procedures For Classifying "Enemy Combat-
ants": Congress, What Have You Done?, 43 TEX. INT'L LJ. 41,43 (2007).
6. See infra Part II.A; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 507; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d
981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
7. See infra Parts II.B.2.c, II.B.2.e. The constitutional provision relied upon
by the detainees is the Suspension Clause in Article I, § 9, cl. 2. See infra Part III.A
for a discussion of whether the Suspension Clause guarantees access to habeas
corpus as of right.
8. 476 F.3d at 981.
9. See infra Part II.B.2.
10. See infra Part II.B.2.f, III.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.f.
12. See infra Part II.
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to argue that the GITMO detainees are not entitled to habeas cor-
pus, and Eisentrager's relation to the recent habeas corpus petitions
brought by GITMO detainees to challenge the basis for their de-
tention in federal court.
1
3
In Part III, this article shows that the writ of habeas corpus is a
constitutional right."4 The differences between the petitioners in
Eisentrager and the GITMO detainees require courts to entertain
writs of habeas corpus and adjudicate the propriety of executive de-
15tention of the GITMO detainees. This note concludes, however,
that the GITMO detainees can be deprived of this right for six
months after their initial detention. Those subject to trial by mili-
tary commission or declared prisoners of war also lack habeas
rights because of the deference courts generally show the Executive
during times of war."
II. BACKGROUND: THAT GREAT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
CASES BEARING ON WHETHER GITMO DETAINEES ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO PETITION FEDERAL COURTS FOR
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY
JURISDICTION
A. The History of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpusis is the primary tool used to chal-
lenge the propriety of an individual's detention. The writ "func-
tions as a minimal guarantor of due process by requiring, upon is-
suance of the writ or an order to show cause, an executive detainor
[sic] tojustify the legality of the petitioner's detention."1 9
13. Id.




18. There are many different writs of habeas corpus. The one that is gener-
ally known as the writ of habeas corpus today is technically the writ of habeas cor-
pus ad subjiciendum. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 4 (1980) (emphasis removed); HURD, supra note 2, at 229. The writ of ha-
beas corpus ad subjiciendum became known as the writ of habeas corpus because it
became "inseparably associated" with the "vindication of the right of personal lib-
erty" against "whatever power infringed." HURD, supra note 2, at 129-30 (emphasis
added).
19. Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of
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The establishment of the writ in England is "'esteemed the
best and only sufficient defense of personal liberty.' 2 Initially, the
writ was a tool used to establish and protect the jurisdiction of the
Crown's courts against the interference of local courts, by requiring
the recipient of the writ to produce "'the body.' 2' The writ slowly
developed over time from a jurisdictional tool into a significant
check on the power of the Crown to detain someone without
cause.22 By 1620, the writ developed into a powerful "vehicle to free
someone held by the Executive" without justification.3 Prior to the
24
enactment of the first Habeas Corpus Act in 1641, the writ was not
universally available to those detained by the Crown without25
cause. The Crown was still able to avoid judicial review by using
the Court of the Star Chamber.26 By abolishing the Court of the
Star Chamber, which heard cases in secret with no right to appeal,
"Parliament firmly established that the Writ could be asserted
against any detention ordered by the King. '' 27 The passage of the
second Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, described by Blackstone as the
"second Magna Carta, 28 fully matured the writ into a powerful
check on executive power, as the Act "clearly stated that no person
should be held by the Crown without good cause., 29 As Blackstone
explained:
To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by proc-
20. DUKER, supra note 18, at 7 (citing ExparteYerger, 75 U.S. 85,95 (1868)).
21. SeeJohn A. Sholar, Jr., Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror, 45 DuQ. L. REv.
661, 667 (2007); see also DUKER, supra note 18, at 24, 27 ("[T]he prerogative writ of
habeas corpus was a judicial mechanism by which the sheriff or other custodian
was commanded to 'have the body' of some person before the court.").
22. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 4 ("By the writ of habeas corpus, the High
Court... at the insistence of a subject aggrieved, commanded the production of
that subject, and inquired into the cause of his imprisonment. If there were no
legal justification for the detention, the party was ordered released .... ") (cita-
tions omitted); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("At its historical
core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of
Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strong-
est."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the historical purpose of the writ as relieving detention by executive authori-
ties withoutjudicial trial).
23. See Sholar, supra note 21, at 668-69.
24. See generally BADSHAH K. MiAN, AMERICAN HABEAS CoRPus: LAW, HISTORY,
AND POLITICS 22-23 (1984).
25. See Sholar, supra note 21, at 668-69.
26. See id. at 669.
27. Id.
28. WILLAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *133.
29. Sholar, supra note 21, at 669.
2008] 5159
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ess from the courts ofjudicature, or by warrant from some
legal officer, having authority to commit to prison; which
warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal of
the magistrate, and express the causes of the commit-
ment, in order to be examined into (if necessary) upon a
habeas corpus .... For the law judges in this respect...
that it is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to sig-
nify withal the crimes alleged against him.
3 0
The protections afforded by the writ as it developed in Eng-
land were brought over to the American Colonies3' and were in-
32corporated in the U.S. Constitution. The Suspension Clause has
been interpreted by the Court and commentators to protect the
writ as it existed in 1789. 33 It states, "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. 34 At the
framing of the Constitution, the founding fathers understood that
the writ was an important part of the system of checks and balances
created by the Constitution.3 5 It is the only common-law writ spe-
30. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES "131-33.
31. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973) ("By the time the
American Colonies achieved independence, the use of habeas corpus to secure
release from unlawful physical confinement, whether judicially imposed or not,
was thus an integral part of our common-law heritage."); see also DUKER, supra note
18, at 115; Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ:Judicial Review, Due Process,
and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 69
(2005); Sholar, supra note 21, at 670-71.
As the writ has developed in America, it is used in two typical scenarios.
First, the writ is routinely used by convicted criminals to prosecute collateral chal-
lenges to the propriety of their incarceration. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1290-1324
(5th ed. 2003); DUKER, supra note 18, at 181-211. This article is unconcerned with
this type of habeas corpus, as it has no bearing on whether GITMO detainees are
constitutionally entitled to challenge the basis for their detention. Instead, this
article focuses on the second use of the writ: a tool to challenge unauthorized ex-
ecutive detention. See Part II.A.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
33. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("at the absolute minimum,
the Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789'"); Paul Halliday & G.
Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 7, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1008252) ("habeas corpus
decisions should be guided.., by an understanding of the legal status of the writ
'as it existed in 1789.'"); see, e.g., infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; infra
Part II.B.2.f.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
35. Sholar, supra note 21, at 687-88.
5160 [Vol. 34:5
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cifically mentioned in the Constitution and has been described as
"a central tenet of American democracy. 37 In Rasul v. Bush,38 the
Court noted that habeas corpus is "a writ antecedent to statute,
throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law., 39 It has
been described as "the symbol and guardian of individual liberty.""
Its "primary purpose . . . [is] to rein in the power of the Execu-
tive.
" 4 1
The writ is a creature of statute as well. Prior to the enactment
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 200542 and the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006,4  federal district courts could hear applications
for habeas corpus by anyone claiming to be held "in custody in vio-
lation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
44
As the Supreme Court explained, "Section 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 authorized federal courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus
to prisoners who are 'in custody, under or by colour of the author-
ity of the United States, or are committed for trial before some
court of the same.' 45 The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and
Military Commissions Act of 2006 expressly deprive those detained
at GITMO from filing applications for habeas corpus with federal
36. See David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 59, 61-62 (2006).
37. Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS.
473, 480 (2007).
38. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
39. Id. at 473 (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)) (in-
ternal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
40. DUKER, supra note 18, at 7 (quoting Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58
(1968)).
41. Sholar, supra note 21, at 673; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)
("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of review-
ing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., con-
curring); DUKER, supra note 18, at 4 ("By the writ of habeas corpus, the High Court
... at the insistence of the subject aggrieved, commanded the production of that
subject, and inquired into the cause of his imprisonment. If there were no legal
justification for the detention, the party was ordered released.") (citations omit-
ted).
42. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
43. See infra Part II.B.2.e.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (2006).
45. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting the Judiciary Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82). In 1867, Congress extended access to the writ to
"all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of
the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
51612008]
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district courts.46
Habeas corpus has a powerful history of acting as a check on
executive power. It is no surprise that the GITMO detainees at-
tempted to use it to challenge their indefinite detention by the47 ..
government. The primary issue determining whether the GITMO
detainees are entitled to challenge their detention after the passage
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and Military Commissions
Act of 2006 is whether the detainees have a constitutional right to48
do so. The government relies on Johnson v. Eisentrager, discussed
49below, to argue that they do not.
B. Johnson v. Eisentrager's Role in the GITMO Detainee Litigation
and Congressional Attempts to Limit Habeas Corpus
Johnson v. Eisentrager is the primary tool used by the govern-
ment to argue that detainees have no constitutional habeas corpus
rights. 5° Eisentrager and subsequent Supreme Court cases, as well as
Congress's response to the Supreme Court, provide the framework
on the issue of whether GITMO detainees have a constitutional
right at stake.
1. Johnson v. Eisentrager
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court ruled that German citizens,
characterized by the Court as "alien enem[ies] engaged in the hos-
tile service of a government at war with the United States,"'" did not
have a constitutional right to challenge their convictions via habeas
corpus. 52 Federal courts lacked statutory jurisdiction under Ahrens
v. Clark because the petitioners were not within the territorial ju-
54risdiction of the district court.
46. See infra Part II.B.2.c; II.B.2.e.
47. See infra Part II.B.2.
48. See infra Part III.A.1.
49. See infra Part II.B.1.
50. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
51. Id. at 785.
52. Id. at 790-91.
53. 335 U.S. 188 (1948), abrogated by Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky.,
410 U.S. 484 (1973).
54. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767 (citing Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948),
abrogated by Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)). Federal
courts initially had statutory jurisdiction in the GITMO detainee litigation because
Braden eliminated Ahrens'jurisdictional requirement that a prisoner be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court. See infra notes 66-67 and accompany-
5162 [Vol. 34:5
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The D.C. Circuit had ruled that despite the absence of statu-
tory jurisdiction, the petitioners were constitutionally entitled to
challenge their detention. The court held that "any person, includ-
ing an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under any
purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ if he
can show that extension to his cases of any constitutional rights or
limitations would show his imprisonment illegal. 55 To reach this
conclusion, the D.C. Circuit relied on the inherent judicial power
of U.S. courts, arguing that the Constitution required that there be
a court with jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims.56
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit. After assuming
that there was no statutory jurisdiction for the writ, the Court ruled
that the petitioners were not constitutionally entitled to petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the absence of statutory jurisdiction be-
cause they were alien enemies. The Court began its opinion by
stating:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any
other country where the writ is known, has issued it on
behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no
stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial juris-
diction. Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends
such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.
The Court in Eisentrager articulated a sliding scale test to de-
termine whether those detained outside the United States have
constitutional rights. Under the test, aliens' rights increase with
58their degree of connection to the United States. According to this
scale, an alien lawfully present in the United States receives signifi-
cant constitutional protection5 9 and cannot be detained or de-
ported without a "full and fair hearing., 60 During a time of war,
ing text.
55. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767.
56. Id. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Juris-
diction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARv. L. REv. 2029, 2055-56
(2007) (explaining that the D.C. Circuit "reasoned that the petitioners possessed,
or at least arguably possessed, constitutional rights assertable against some federal
officials; that the Constitution therefore required the availability of habeas juris-
diction in some court to entertain their claims; that no state court could exercise
jurisdiction; and that the federal habeas statute must therefore be construed to
extend jurisdiction, other obstacles to that conclusion notwithstanding").
57. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 770-76.
59. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process protections to resident aliens).
60. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770-71.
2008] 5163
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however, citizens of countries that are at war with the United States,
or "enemy aliens," were historically subject to summary arrest and
deportation. 6' Additionally, during a time of war, a resident enemy
alien's right to litigation is limited if the exercise of that right
would hinder the war effort or assist the opposing country.! The
Eisentrager Court did not state that during a time of war enemy
aliens were subject to indefinite detention, without access to any
means to determine the propriety of their detention.
The Eisentrager Court's argument for denying the petitioners a
constitutional right to habeas is that a resident enemy alien's rights
are diminished during a time of war and, therefore, an enemy alien
who lacks presence or property within the United States certainly
does not have the right to bring litigation in U.S. courts.6 3 Ulti-
mately, the Court held that no right to habeas corpus exists when
the prisoner:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory
and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d)
was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside
the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war com-
mitted outside the United States; (f) and is at all times
imprisoned outside the United States.
Because Eisentrager held that enemy combatants detained in
Germany were not constitutionally entitled to the protections of
habeas corpus, Eisentrager is one of the main barriers to the GITMO
detainees' attempts to argue that they are entitled to such protec-
tion. In Part III, this note argues that Eisentrager does not support
denying a constitutional right to habeas to the GITMO detainees
because according to Eisentrager's sliding scale of rights for aliens,
the GITMO detainees possess the constitutional right to habeas re-
lief.
2. The GITMO Detainee Litigation and Congressional Action
The Supreme Court and Congress have gone back and forth
on how exactly to treat the GITMO detainees. In Rasul v. Bush and
61. Id. at 771-72, 775.
62. Id. at 776 (citing ExparteKawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942)).
63. Id. at 777 (citing Ex parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510 (1942); Masterson v.
Howard, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 99, 105 (1873); Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
216, 236 (1871)).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
5164 [Vol. 34:5
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court refused to allow the government to
detain alleged enemy combatants indefinitely without process, and
Congress responded by enacting the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005. Then, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld assessed the propriety of trying a
GITMO detainee by military commission and the effect of the De-
tainee Treatment Act on the GITMO detainees' ability to file writs
of habeas corpus. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 was en-
acted after Hamdan and stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear habeas petitions brought by GITMO detainees. Finally, Boum-
ediene v. Bush challenges the constitutionality of that action.
a. Rasul v. Bush
In Rasul, the first GITMO detainee case to reach the Supreme
Court, the Court addressed whether federal courts had statutory ju-
risdiction over writs of habeas corpus filed by the GITMO detainees
to challenge the legality of their detention. 5  The detainees
claimed that their indefinite detention at GITMO was illegal be-
cause they never engaged in terrorist activity or took up arms
against the United States.66 The Court ruled that according to the
then-current habeas corpus jurisdictional statute, federal courts
had jurisdiction over the GITMO detainees' petitions for habeas
corpus. Because it found statutory jurisdiction, the Court did not
determine whether the GITMO detainees have a constitutional
right to challenge their detention via writs of habeas corpus.68
The Court first explained that Eisentrager did not bar the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the GITMO detainees' claims because the
Court had jurisdiction according to the habeas jurisdictional stat-
ute.69 After explaining how Eisentrager was not implicated, the
Court provided a number of insightful comments that suggest that
the Court was attuned to the separation-of-powers concerns raised
by not allowing the petitioners to challenge the legality of their de-
tention. 70 Additionally, the Court explained in dicta how it would
resolve whether the GITMO detainees had a constitutional right to
challenge their detention via habeas corpus."
65. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
66. Id. at 471-72.
67. Id. at 485.
68. Id. at 476.
69. See id. at 479.
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The Court provided a number of comments that are probative
on the issue of whether the GITMO detainees enjoy the constitu-
tional right to habeas corpus. It noted that according to common
law, "even if a territory was 'no part of the realm,' there was 'no
doubt' as to the court's power to issue writs of habeas corpus if the
territory was 'under the subjection of the Crown.' 7 2 Furthermore,
"[1] ater cases confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not on
formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical
question of 'the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or do-
minion exercised in fact by the Crown.'"73
The Court also hinted that Eisentrager would not have con-
trolled its determination of whether the GITMO detainees were
constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus, even if there was no
statutory basis for habeas jurisdiction, because of the key distinc-
tions between the GITMO detainees and the Eisentrager petition-
ers.74 These distinctions included the fact that the GITMO detain-
ees are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and
that the GITMO detainees have not been determined to be enemyS 75
combatants by any independent tribunal.
The Court gave another strong hint that Eisentrager would not
have barred federal court jurisdiction over the GITMO detainees'
habeas claims, even in the absence of statutory jurisdiction, when it
stated "nothing in Eisentrager or in any of our other cases categori-
cally excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the
United States from the 'privilege of litigation' in U.S. courts.
76
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rasul is also instructive. He
suggests that Eisentrager is really a separation-of-powers case and
should be applied to the GITMO detainees, but that it does not bar
federal court jurisdiction over the GITMO detainees. Instead, Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that Eisentrager merely "indicates that there
is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judi-
cial power may not enter., 77 Kennedy suggests that Eisentrager sets
up a framework that requires courts to determine whether the ha-
beas petitions of those in military custody intrude upon the realm
72. Id. at 482 (citing King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 854-55, 97 Eng. Rep. 587,
598-99 (K.B.)).
73. Id. (citing Ex paite Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (C.A.) (Lord Ever-
shed, M. R.)).
74. Id. at 476.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
77. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of exclusive executive power by examining the facts underlying the
detention."' Kennedy conducted this analysis of the status of the
GITMO detainees and concluded that jurisdiction over the GITMO
detainees' habeas petitions was proper because GITMO was "in
every practical respect a United States territory . . . far removed
from any hostilities." 9
Justice Kennedy then examines the separation-of-powers rami-
fications of denying the GITMO detainees the writ to challenge
their detention, and reasoned that under Eisentrager's framework,
jurisdiction is proper. Justice Kennedy reasoned that, "[i] ndefinite
detention without trial or other proceeding presents altogether dif-
ferent considerations [than those present in Eisentrager]. It allows
friends and foes alike to remain in detention. It suggests a weaker
case of military necessity and much greater alignment with the tra-
ditional function of habeas corpus. " 0
Rasul begins the GITMO detainees' attempt to challenge their
detention with a victory for the detainees. The Court found statu-
tory jurisdiction and set the framework for arguing that the
GITMO detainees had a constitutional right to habeas relief despite
Eisenrager.
b. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdi, the Court considered what process was owed an
American citizen who challenged his designation as an enemy
combatant. 81 Hamdi, as an American citizen was not subject to Eis-
entrager's barrier and accordingly, the Court again did not directly
address whether the GITMO detainees are constitutionally entitled
to the writ of habeas corpus. A plurality of the Court did signifi-
cantly limit the scope of review available on habeas corpus for
American citizens, holding that as long as a detainee has notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision maker, the
review traditionally available on habeas might be delegated to a
military tribunal.
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghani-
stan after he allegedly took up arms against the United States and
fought with the Taliban in the months after al Qaeda's terrorist at-
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 488.
81. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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812tack against the United States on September 11, 2001. Hamdi was
initially detained at GITMO for three months, but when the gov-
ernment learned Hamdi was an American citizen, it transferred
him to military custody within the United States. 3 A writ of habeas
corpus was filed on Hamdi's behalf, claiming that he was not an
enemy combatant and challenging his indefinite detention without
access to counsel s4
The government argued that it was entitled to detain Hamdi
indefinitely because it had classified him as an enemy combatant.85
The only justification offered by the government for its conclusion
that Hamdi was an enemy combatant was an affidavit based on
hearsay that stated that this designation was "' [b] ased upon his in-
terviews and in light of his association with the Taliban.",6 The dis-
trict court held that this affidavit "fell far short" of justifying
Hamdi's detention and ordered the government to produce more
evidence."' The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling,
reasoning that the affidavit was sufficient because "separation of
powers principles prohibited a federal court from 'delv[ing] fur-
ther into Hamdi's status and capture.' 8  The Fourth Circuit also
held that if congressional authorization was required for Hamdi's
detention, the Authorization for Use of Military Force89 (AUMF)
provided sufficient justification. 9°
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed that Hamdi's deten-
tion was authorized, but there was no majority opinion of the
Court.91 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy,
82. Id. at 510.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 511.
85. Id. at 510-11.
86. Id. at 513.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 515.
89. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001).
90. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515. The AUMF was passed by Congress one week af-
ter al Qaeda's terror attacks on September 11, 2001 and authorized the President
to use:
all neccssary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.
AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224.
91. See generally John S. Baker, Competing Paradigms of Constitutional Power in
5168 [Vol. 34:5
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and Bryer, wrote for a plurality of the Court. The plurality con-
cluded that the detention of American citizens who actually took
up arms against the United States as enemy combatants was specifi-
cally authorized by the AUMF, as it was "so fundamental and ac-
cepted an incident to war"'92 as to be part of the "necessary and ap-
propriate force"93 authorized by the AUMF.
94
The plurality then addressed what process is constitutionally
due a citizen detained as an enemy combatant who challenges his
enemy combatant designation.95 The government contended that,
because of the "extraordinary constitutional interests at stake," a
factual review of the propriety of Hamdi's detention was unwar-
ranted.99  To determine what process is constitutionally due, the
plurality applied the Matthews v. Eldridge 7 test, which weighs "'the
private interest that will be affected by the official action' against
the Government's asserted interest, 'including the function in-
volved' and the burdens the Government would face in providing
,,98
greater process.
After conducting the Matthews balancing, the plurality held
that Hamdi was entitled to notice of the factual basis of his enemy
combatant designation and the ability to challenge this designation
before a neutral decision maker. 99 To relieve the government of
the burden of providing such a hearing during wartime, several re-
ductions in the ordinary level of process were found appropriate,
including the acceptance of hearsay evidence and a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of the government, and a properly constituted
military tribunal.100
The plurality rejected the government's argument that separa-
tion-of-powers concerns required courts to essentially "butt-out" of
military affairs by making clear that the deference to the Executive
traditionally shown during wartime does not mean the Executive
"The War on Terrorism," 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5, 9-15 (2005)
(discussing Hamdi in the course of his argument that by reviewing executive action
outside the United States, the Supreme Court is intruding on the exclusive prov-
ince of the executive branch).
92. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
93. AUMF § 2, 115 Stat. 224.
94. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
95. See id. at 524-39.
96. Id. at 527.
97. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
98. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335).
99. Id. at 533.
100. Id. at 533-34, 538.
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has a blank check.'0' It held that "[w]hatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it
most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individ-
ual liberties are at stake."0 2
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred with the
plurality opinion in part, dissented in part, and concurred in the
judgment. 03 Justice Souter argued that a citizen's detention was
not authorized by the AUMF in this circumstance and that Hamdi
should therefore be released. 0 4 Justice Souter first argued that
clear congressional authority was required to detain a citizen as an
enemy combatant because of the Non-Detention Act, °5 which states
in no uncertain terms, "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or other-
wise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress." 06 Justice Souter then examined the language of the
AUMF and the historical propriety of detaining citizens as enemy
combatants and concluded that the AUMF was insufficiently clear
to authorize Hamdi's detention under the Non-Detention Act.1
0 7
Justice Souter stated that even without the explicit congressional
authorization, which he believed was required for the detention of
a citizen as an enemy combatant, such detention was constitution-
ally permitted for a short time during a genuine emergency.108
Despite Justice Souter's disagreement with the plurality's con-
clusion that the AUMF authorized the detention of a citizen as an
enemy combatant, he joined the judgment of the plurality because
he understood the importance of issuing an opinion by the Court
that would give Hamdi the benefit of notice and an opportunity to
101. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
102. Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)).
103. Id. at 539 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concur-
ring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 541.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
106. Id. § 4001(a).
107. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542-45 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment).
108. Id. at 552. Justice Souter cited Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127
(1866), which considered the propriety of trying citizens by military commission
for allegedly treasonous activity during the end of the Civil War, for the possibility
that an emergency may lead the detention of citizens by the military for a short
period of time. Based on Milligan, Justice Souter concluded that it was not proper
in this case because civilian courts are open. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
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refute his classification as an enemy combatant.'09
justice Scalia dissented."" He argued that absent suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, the government could not detain a citi-
zen indefinitely without charge.'11 According to Justice Scalia, the
government's claim of military exigency was not sufficient to justify
indefinite detention without charge unless Congress suspends the
writ of habeas corpus.112 Justice Scalia argued "[w]here the Gov-
ernment accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitu-
tional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for trea-
son or some other crime."' Justice Scalia's view is based in his
understanding of the role of the writ of habeas corpus in the sepa-
ration-of-powers framework. As Justice Scalia explains, the writ of
habeas corpus' traditional use was to ensure "freedom from indefi-
nite imprisonment at the will of the Executive"'1 4 and as such was a
core function of the courts in the constitutional system of separated
115
powers.
Justice Scalia took specific issue with the plurality's characteri-
zation of the indefinite detention of citizens as enemy combatants
as being a common practice of war and therefore authorized by the
AUMF. Justice Scalia argued, instead, that this was an accurate de-
scription of the fate of resident alien enemy combatants, but was
not the traditional fate of citizens accused of treason.'10  Justice
109. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553 (Souter,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) ([]n joining with the plurality to produce a
judgment, I do not adopt the plurality's resolution of constitutional issues that I
would not reach. It is not that I could disagree with the plurality's determinations
(given the plurality's view of the Force Resolution) that someone in Hamdi's posi-
tion is entitled at a minimum to notice of the Government's claimed factual basis
for holding him, and to a fair chance to rebut it before a neutral decisionmaker;
nor, of course, could I disagree with the plurality's affirmation of Hamdi's right to
counsel. On the other hand, I do not mean to imply agreement that the Govern-
ment could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on
Hamdi or that an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate
or truncate enquiry by a court on habeas.") (citations omitted)).
110. Justice Thomas also dissented. Justice Thomas went further afield than
the other members of the Court. He reasoned that Hamdi's indefinite detention
was an appropriate exercise of the government's war power. Accordingly, no judi-
cial oversight of Hamdi's detention was constitutionally proper. See id. at 579-99
(ThomasJ., dissenting). This conclusion seems untenable.
111. See id. at 554 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 554-55. See also supra Part II.A.
115. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-58 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
116. Id. at 558-59.
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Scalia argues that non-citizen enemy combatants (who were not
charged with war crimes)' 7 were traditionally detained until the/ .... 118
end of hostilities. This is consistent with the sliding scale of rights
articulated in Eisentrager,"9 but noticeably says nothing about the
propriety of indefinitely detaining aliens who contest their enemy
combatant status. Justice Scalia's position is reconcilable with the
idea that the GITMO detainees have constitutional rights, espe-
cially because they have not received process to determine whether
they are actually enemy combatants. Furthermore, the facts of the
GITMO detainees' detention point towards the availability of ha-
beas relief.
20
c. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
After the Court's decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, Congress en-
acted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).12' The DTA
purports to set up a framework for handling the detention of en-
emy combatants at GITMO consistent with the procedures the gov-
ernment believed were required after Hamdi. While trying to re-
spond to Hamdi, Congress went too far, as the DTA
unconstitutionally strips federal courts of jurisdiction over the ha-
beas petitions brought by the GITMO detainees, in violation of the
Suspension Clause.
Before stripping federal courts of jurisdiction, the DTA estab-
lished several procedural protections for the GITMO detainees.
Section 1002 of the DTA sets forth standards for interrogating de-
122tainees, while section 1003 prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrad-1 . • 123
ing treatment of the GITMO detainees. The most important por-
tion of the DTA is the provision that sets out the framework for
reviewing the status of GITMO detainees. Section 1005 of the DTA
provides an administrative procedure for determining the enemyS 124
combatant status of detainees. It requires the Secretary of De-
fense to give annual reports to Congress on the number of detain-
117. See infra Part II.B.2.e.
118. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 558-59 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
121. Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, 119
Stat. 2739.
122. Id. § 1002, 119 Stat. at 2739.
123. Id. § 1003, 119 Stat. at 2739-40.
124. Id. § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2740-44.
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ees whose status was reviewed and the procedures for the review.1
5
The DTA limits judicial review for all GITMO detainees by stat-
ing in section 1005(e) (1) that except as provided in the DTA, "no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider..
. an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of
an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba."' 12r The DTA provides for limited review of the adminis-
trative determination in the D.C. Circuit, but this review is only
available to detainees who have been determined by the adminis-
trative process to be enemy combatants. 2' The scope of this review
is also limited to whether the administrative determination is con-
sistent with the DTA's procedures and whether those procedures
are consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States1. / ,121
"to the extent applicable.
As discussed in Part III, the DTA violates the Constitution. For
all intents and purposes, the DTA removes the availability of habeas
corpus, without providing a way for detainees to challenge the pro-
priety of their detention until after the administrative process has
run its course. Perhaps this would be acceptable if the DTA re-
quired that the administrative process take place within a certain
period of time, but it does not. Essentially, it allows the govern-
ment to hold an alleged enemy combatant, without allowing that
enemy combatant to challenge the propriety of the detention until
the government is ready to initiate the administrative process. This
violates the Suspension Clause because the GITMO detainees are
constitutionally entitled to challenge the basis for their deten-
tion. 29
d. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Unsurprisingly, the DTA's stripping of habeas jurisdiction was
challenged almost immediately. In Hamdan, the Court addressed
the propriety of trying detainees by military commission.1 30 By rul-
ing that Hamdan was not subject to trial by military commission,
the Court significantly lessened the deference it had shown to the
government in Hamdi. Additionally, the Court set forth important
125. Id. § 1005(d), 119 Stat. at 2741.
126. Id. § 1005(e) (1), 119 Stat. at 2742.
127. Id. § 1005(e) (2), 119 Stat. at 2742-43.
128. Id. § 1005(e) (2) (C), 119 Stat. at 2742.
129. See infra Part III.
130. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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principles determining when the use of military commissions is ap-
propriate.
Hamdan, a GITMO detainee charged with conspiracy to
commit offenses triable by military commission, challenged the
government's contention that he was subject to trial by military
commission.' The D.C. Circuit rejected Hamdan's contention
that he was not subject to trial by milita commission and denied
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court re-
versed the D.C. Circuit because the Court held that the military
commission convened to try Hamdan violated the procedures of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).133 Additionally, a
plurality of the Court held that Hamdan was not charged with an
offense triable by military commission.13
Hamdan's primary importance to this article is its discussion of
the applicability of the DTA to Hamdan's habeas petition. After
the Court granted certiorari from the D.C. Circuit's dismissal of
Hamdan's habeas petition, Congress enacted the DTA. The gov-
ernment argued that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions contained
in section 1005(e) of the DTA stripped the Court of jurisdiction
over Hamdan's habeas petition. 3 5 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority of the Court, rejected the government's argument because
according to ordinary principles of statutory construction, the DTA
did not strip the Court's jurisdiction for cases pending at the time136
the DTA was enacted. Accordingly, the Court could exercise
statutory jurisdiction.
The Court then moved on to address whether Hamdan was
subject to trial by military commission. The government argued
that its authority to try Hamdan by military commission stemmed
from an Executive order issued November 13, 2001. President
Bush proclaimed that individuals covered by the order "shall, when
tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses tri-
able by military commission that such individual is alleged to have
committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties
131. Id. at 2759-60.
132. Id. at 2759.
133. Id. (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1998
& Supp. 2007)).
134. Id. at 2759-60.
135. Id. at 2762-69.
136. Id. at 2764-69. The Court relied on a contextual reading of the language
of the DTA to conclude that Congress had not intended the DTA to apply to
pending cases. Id. at 2765-66.
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provided under applicable law, including imprisonment or
death.'' 137 The order covers "noncitizen[s] for whom the President
determines 'there is reason to believe' that he or she (1) 'is or was'
a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or participated in terror-
ist activities aimed at or harmful to the United States."'38 President
Bush declared Hamdan subject to trial by military commission on
July 3, 2003.139 Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit of-
fenses triable by military commission, such as "attacking civilians;
attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent;
,,140and terrorism.
Again the Court fractured. A plurality of the Court deter-
mined that Hamdan had not been charged with an offense triable
by military commission 4' and a majority of the Court held that the
commission did not have authority to try Hamdan because the
structure and procedure of the military commission violated the
UCMJ.
142
The Court ruled that the DTA, the AUMF, and the UCMJ "at
most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene mili-
tary commissions in circumstances where justified under the 'Con-
stitution and laws,' including the law of war.' 4' Because the com-
mission convened to try Hamdan was not specifically authorized by
Congress, the plurality had to determine whether the commission
was justified. The plurality noted that military commissions were
traditionally used in three scenarios.' 44 First, when martial law is
declared, military commissions substitute for civilian courts. 145 Sec-
ond, military commissions are used "as part of a temporary military
137. Id. at 2760 (quoting Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [here-
inafter Detention Order]).
138. Id. (quoting Detention Order, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,834).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2761 (internal quotation omitted).
141. Id. at 2759-60.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2775 (majority opinion).
144. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 831-46 (Igor I. Kavass & Adolf Sprudzs eds., William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc. 1979) (1920)).
145. Id. The plurality noted that in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), the Court summarized the limitations on this use of military commissions
as "if this [military] government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a
gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open,
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." Hamdan, 126
S. Ct. at 2776 n.25 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127).
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government over occupied enemy territory or territory regained
from an enemy where civilian government cannot and does not
function.' 46 Third and most pertinent to this note, military com-
missions are "convened as an 'incident to the conduct of war' when
there is a need 'to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military ef-
fort have violated the law of war . . . . -14 The plurality noted that
this type of commission was very different from the other two and
that "its role is primarily a factfinding one-to determine, typically
on the battlefield itself, whether the defendant has violated the law
of war." 148 This was the type of commission convened to try Ham-
dan, because martial law had not been declared and Hamdan was
not being held in enemy territory.
149
The plurality noted the common law limitations on the third
type of military commission, convened as an incident to war.150
First, the military commission only has jurisdiction over offenses
committed in the theater of war. Second, the military commis-
sion may not try offenses committed before or after the war, only
those committed during the war.152 Third, the military commission
may only try "' [i] ndividuals of the enemy's army who have been
guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offences [sic] in violation of
the laws of war' and members of one's own army 'who, in time of
war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or
triable, by the criminal courts or under the Articles of war."",1
53
Fourth and finally, the military commission may only try
"[v]iolations of the laws and usages of war" cognizable by military
tribunal and certain breaches of military orders and regulations.1
54
The plurality then argued that the charges against Hamdan
146. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304, 314 (1946)). The plurality noted that this type of commission must be "tai-
lored to the tribunals' purpose and the exigencies that necessitate their use. They
may be employed 'pending the establishment of civil government,'" which may in
some cases "extend beyond the 'cessation of hostilities."' Id. at 2776 n.26 (citing
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348, 354-55 (1952)).
147. Id. (citing ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942)).
148. Id. (citing John M. Bickers, Military Commissions are Constitutionally Sound:
A Response to Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH L. REv. 899, 902 (2003)).
149. Id. at 2777.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 144, at 836).
152. Id. (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 144, at 837).
153. Id. (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 144, at 838).
154. Id. (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 144, at 839).
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did not satisfy the above requirements for numerous reasons, in-
cluding the fact that the events upon which the charge of conspir-
acy were based occurred before September 11, 2001, and that none
of the events occurred in the theater of war. 115 The larger problem
the plurality identified with trying Hamdan by military commission
was that conspiracy was not a violation of the laws of war and there-
fore was not triable by this third type of military commission.' 5
A majority of the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit because it
held that the procedures the government had established for the
military commission violated the UCMJ.' 57 The Court arrived at this
conclusion due to unexplained variances between the procedures
set forth to try Hamdan and the procedures set forth in the
UCMJ. 1
s
Justice Kennedy joined the majority's judgment that the mili-
tary commission established to try Hamdan lacked the power to
proceed because it violated the procedures set forth the UCMJ and
explained several key separation-of-powers problems with trial by
military commission." 9 Justice Kennedy noted that "It]rial by mili-
tary commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest
order. Located within a single branch, these courts carry the risk
that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by ex-
ecutive officials without independent review.' 160  Because these
courts are located within a single branch, they concentrate power
and "[c] oncentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbi-
trary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution's three-part
system is designed to avoid." '
The end result of the Court's decision in Hamdan is that the
DTA did not apply to cases pending at the time of its enactment.
Accordingly, federal courts retained statutory jurisdiction over ha-
beas petitions pending prior to the DTA's enactment. Additionally,
the Court became increasingly sensitive to the government's in-
fringement upon the traditional role of the courts. The Court still
155. Id. at 2777-78.
156. Id. at 2779. Although the plurality's position that Hamdan was not ac-
cused of an offense triable by military commission did not command a majority of
the Court, it is worth noting because it lends strength to the argument that using
military procedures alone is not appropriate. See infra Part III.
157. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 2793.
159. Id. at 2799-2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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did not delve into the issue of primary concern to this article,
whether the GITMO detainees have a constitutional right to the
protections of habeas corpus in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion. However, by ruling that Hamdan was not subject to trial by
military commission, the Court provided a strong hint that it was
becoming less and less willing to defer completely to the govern-
ment's assertion of executive power to detain individuals indefi-
nitely.
e. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
As Hamdan ruled the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the
DTA inapplicable to pending cases, it is not surprising that Con-
gress attempted to cure this defect. Congress's answer to Hamdan
was the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). 112 In the MCA,
Congress completely stripped all courts of jurisdiction over all
pending or future habeas petitions brought by, or on behalf of,
GITMO detainees. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Boumediene v.
Bush, 16 with the MCA, Congress was saying "When we say all [ha-
beas petitions], we mean all-without exception!"'
In Congress's effort to be extraordinarily clear that it intended
to strip courts ofjurisdiction, section 7(a) of the MCA states that:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or isI • • 165
awaiting such determination.
Section 7(b) of the MCA specifically provides that section 7(a)
of the MCA:
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate
to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of detention of an alien detained by the
162. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(e), and
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e) (1)).
163. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
164. Id. at 987 (internal quotation and emphasis omitted).
165. Military Commissions Act § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2636.
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United States since September 11, 2001.16
The practical effect of these two provisions is "to permanently
deny aliens the right to challenge before an independent legal
body the reasons, if any, for their imprisonment."'167 As there can
be no realistic argument that the MCA does not apply to the
GITMO detainees' habeas petitions, the stage is set for the Court's
resolution of whether the GITMO detainees have a constitutional
right to challenge their detention, absent statutory authorization.
f Boumediene v. Bush
Now that the Court has granted certiorari in Boumediene v.
Bush,'68 the question discussed by this article is squarely before the
Court. What follows is an explanation of the D.C. Circuit's opinion
and the stage it sets for the Court's resolution of whether GITMO
detainees are constitutionally entitled to the protections of habeas
corpus.
In Boumediene, numerous non-citizen GITMO detainees peti-
tioned for habeas relief. 69 After the passage of the MCA, the D.C.
Circuit held first that the MCA applied to the habeas petitions be-
fore it and second that the MCA's stripping of habeas jurisdiction
did not constitute an unconstitutional suspension of habeas cor-
170
pUS.
On the question of whether the MCA applied to the petition-
ers' habeas petitions, the court effectively dismissed out of hand
any argument that the MCA did not apply to pending cases.' 7' The
court held that section 7(b) of the MCA was clear and that it ap-
plied to the detainees' habeas petitions. 
72
This brought the court to the constitutional issue, whether the
MCA violates the Suspension Clause. In answering this question,
166. Id. § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2636.
167. Michael, supra note 37, at 479.
168. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
169. Bounediene, 476 F.3d at 984.
170. Id. at 986, 992.
171. Id. at 986-88. In fact, the court noted that Congress could not have been
clearer that it intended to strip jurisdiction completely. Id. at 987 ("Section 7(b)
could not be clearer. It states that 'the amendment made by subsection (a)'-
which repeals habeas jurisdiction-applies to 'all cases, without exception' relating
to any aspect of detention. It is almost as if the proponents of these words were
slamming their fists on the table shouting 'When we say "all," we mean all-without
exception!'" (citing Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §7(b),
120 Stat. 2600, 263)).
172. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988.
20081 5179
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the court traced the protection afforded the writ by the Constitu-
tion 7 3 and framed the issue in terms of whether, prior to 1789, the
writ would have been available to aliens outside the sovereign terri-
tory of the United States.1 74 The court answered this question in
the negative based on its review of the common law and its inter-
pretation of Eisentrager as a complete bar to jurisdiction. 75 The
court concluded that no case holds, and no treatise suggests, that
aliens detained outside the sovereign territory had a right to habeas
relief. 1
76
The D.C. Circuit's conclusion appears to be at odds with the
Supreme Court's dictum in Rasul that its extension of statutory ha-
beas to the GITMO detainees was consistent with the common law
177availability of habeas corpus. The D.C. Circuit distinguished the
cases relied upon by Rasul, by arguing that "[n] ot one of the cases
mentioned in Rasul held that an alien captured abroad and de-
tained outside the United States-or in 'territory over which the
United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control,'-had a
common law or constitutionally protected right to the writ of ha-
beas corpus."' 78 Essentially, the D.C. Circuit went against Supreme
Court dicta by saying that the Court was wrong.
Yet, in its analysis, the D.C. Circuit may have inadvertently
hinted at the reason that habeas may not have been available to
aliens outside sovereign territory in 1789, and additionally one of
the reasons it should presently be available. Due to the second Ha-179
beas Corpus Act of 1679, which required the production of the
prisoner within twenty days after receipt of the writ if the prisoner
was detained more than one hundred miles from the court, appli-
cation of the writ beyond the sovereign territory of the crown
would have made compliance with the Habeas Corpus Act impossi-
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
174. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988.
175. See id. at 988-91 (citingJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
176. Id. at 989-91 (citing WILLAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *131; DUKER,
supra note 18, at 53; 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 116-17,
124 (1982)).
177. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-82 (2004) (dictum). See supra notes 72-
73 and accompanying text. See also Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1002 (Rogers, J., dis-
senting).
178. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d
9, 17 (D.D.C. 2006), remanded by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006)).
The D.C. Circuit also pointed to Justice Scalia's dissent in Rasul Id. (citing Rasul
542 U.S. at 502-05 & n.5 (2004) (ScaliaJ., dissenting)).
179. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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ble.' 8° This difficulty is no longer present, as modern technology
easily allows the production of the prisoner. 8
The D.C. Circuit's resolution of the constitutional issue is open
to attack in the Supreme Court on two main grounds. First, that
GITMO is under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States and accordingly should be treated as part of the sov-
ereign territory of the United States. This is the attack focused
upon by the Boumediene petitioners in their brief to the Supreme
Court. 82 If successful, the Boumediene petitioners would be consti-
tutionally entitled to habeas corpus because they would not be out-
side the sovereign territory of the United States. Therefore, the
GITMO detainees would gain the right to habeas corpus because of
the sliding scale of rights afforded aliens articulated by Eisentrager"s
The second attack on the D.C. Circuit's resolution of the con-
stitutional issue is addressed in Part III of this article. Essentially,
the argument is that the Suspension Clause requires Congress to
confer jurisdiction to hear the GITMO detainees' habeas petitions
because the GITMO detainees are markedly different from the Eis-
entrager petitioners and accordingly possess habeas rights according
to Eisentrager's sliding scale.
It should also be noted that even if the GITMO detainees are
constitutionally entitled to the writ, the government has argued
that courts still lack jurisdiction because the Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunals (CSRT) established by the MCA provide an ade-
quate alternative to habeas review. 84 A full treatment of this argu-
ment is outside the scope of this note, which focuses solely on
whether the GITMO detainees are constitutionally entitled to the
writ in the first place.
85
180. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2008) continues the requirement of producing the
prisoner at the habeas hearing.
182. See Brief of Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007) (No. 06-1195).
183. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
184. See Brief of Boumediene Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct.
3078 (2007) (No. 06-1195).
185. However, it should be noted thatJudge Rogers and a growing number of
commentators have concluded that the CSRTs are not an adequate alternative to
habeas review. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1004-07 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a
Time of Terror, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1193, 1201, 1231 (2007); Fiona de Londras, The Right
to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International Perspective on U.S. Detention of
Suspected Terrorists, 12J. CONFLICT & SEcURrIY L. 223, 227 (2007); Christopher J.
Schatz & Noah A. F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice Denied? Crisis Jurisprudence,
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III. ANALYSIS: THE GITMO DETAINEES POSSESS THE RIGHT TO
HABEAS CORPUS, BUT SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES REQUIRE
THAT THE GITMO DETAINEES' HABEAS RIGHTS BE LIMITED
This part sets forth the argument that the GITMO detainees
have the right to habeas corpus according to Eisentrager's sliding
scale of rights for aliens and that the government's attempt to cur-
tail that right via the MCA violates the Suspension Clause. It does
so without addressing the argument advanced by the petitioners in
Boumediene that GITMO should be treated as part of the United
States. s6 The analysis balances the separation-of-powers principles
in play and, after concluding that the traditional deference shown
the Executive during a time of war justifies a minor limitation on
the GITMO detainees' habeas rights, sets out the proper scope of
these rights.
A. Under Eisentrager's Sliding Scale of Rights for Aliens, the GITMO
Detainees Have a Constitutional Right to the Protections of Habeas Corpus
1. Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus is a Constitutional Right
In accord with the important stature the writ of habeas corpus
has achieved, many argue that the Suspension Clause requires
Congress to confer habeas jurisdiction upon the judiciary.18 The
plain language of the Suspension Clause supports the proposition
that Congress is required to confer habeas jurisdiction on the judi-
ciary, absent an express suspension of habeas corpus as provided inS .185
the Constitution. If Congress was not required to confer habeas
jurisdiction on the judiciary, the Suspension Clause would not be
the Guantdnamo Detainees, and the Imperiled Role of Habeas Corpus in Curbing Abusive
Government Detention, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 539, 602 (2007) ("The DTA review
process is neither an adequate nor effective substitute for habeas review").
186. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Halliday & White, supra note 33, at 107-08 ("The power granted
to the Supreme Court must include more than simply the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus ad testificandum, because otherwise the proviso would, in effect, be
taking away a power and giving it back in the same breath."); Shapiro, supra note
36, at 61-65 (arguing that the "broader view-that the writ is in fact guaranteed by
implication in the Suspension clause" is the most appropriate and plausible inter-
pretation); Ekeland, supra note 19, at 1513-19 (arguing that the writ of habeas is
constitutionally guaranteed).
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, states "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it."
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necessary. Accordingly, Congress must confer jurisdiction to hear
writs of habeas corpus unless the Suspension Clause's requirements
are met.' s9 The failure to do so violates the Suspension Clause.
Not all agree that the Suspension Clause requires Congress to. . .. .190
enact a statute conferring jurisdiction on the courts. Some argue
that the Suspension Clause was intended only to stop Congress
from infringing upon the ability of state courts to inquire into the
detention of federal prisoners. This argument is relatively weak
since Tarble's Case held that state courts could not exercise jurisdic-
tion over habeas petitions of those in federal custody. 19'
Furthermore, commentators and the Supreme Court have con-
firmed that if Congress withholds jurisdiction or fails to confer ju-
risdiction in the first place, Congress has suspended the writ. In Ex
parte Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall noted, while discussing the
Suspension Clause, that "if the means be not in existence, the privi-
lege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should
be enacted.' '9 3 This language has been read to mean that Congress
is required to confer jurisdiction. Professor Shapiro argues that the
best reading of Marshall's statement in Bollman is that "the Suspen-
sion Clause imposed on Congress an obligation to confer habeas
corpus jurisdiction on the judiciary.' ' 19 4 The primary tool used to
argue that the Suspension Clause does not require federal court ju-
risdiction be available is ChiefJustice Marshall's dictum in Boliman,
that "the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United
States, must be given by written law."'11 Professor Neuman explains
that the proper reading of Marshall's passage in dictum is that the
"Suspension Clause did not by its own force vest habeas jurisdiction• • ,,196
in any particular federal court. Professor Neuman's conclusion
189. See Schatz & Horst, supra note 185, at 591-93 (Congress is tasked "by the
Constitution to enact implementing legislation to ensure that the habeas corpus
component of the judicial power may be exercised by the federal courts .... [I]t
is easy to lose sight of the function performed by this component of the judicial
power of the United States in preserving liberty from encroachment by the Execu-
tive Branch."); Shapiro, supra note 36, at 61-65.
190. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 563-64 (2004) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, allows Congress to relax the
usual protections termporarily."); DUKER, supra note 18, at 126.
191. DUKER, supra note 18, at 126.
192. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407-08 (1871) (ruling that the Supremacy Clause
forbade state courts from inquiring into the propriety of federal detention).
193. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch,) 75, 95 (1807) (emphasis added).
194. Shapiro, supra note 36, at 64.
195. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 94.
196. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr,
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is compelling in light of Marshall's statement that the Suspension
Clause obligated Congress to provide "efficient means by which this
great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity.,
97
The Court has confirmed this reading as well. First, in Ex parte
Milligan, the Court understood that even in the absence of con-
gressional authorization, it still had jurisdiction to receive the
writ. 1 8 The Court stated, "[t] he writ issues as a matter of course;
and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party
applying is denied the right of proceeding any further with it.""
In other words, even in the absence of statutory jurisdiction, a court
still has jurisdiction to receive the writ and determine whether to
move forward. °0
Second, in INS v. St. Cyr, the Court made clear that "at the ab-
solute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it ex-
isted in 1789.'""0 Furthermore, Justice Stevens explicitly adopted a
reading of Marshall's comment in Boliman similar to that of Profes-
202
sors Shapiro and Neuman.
Professors Fallon and Meltzer concur in this reading of the
Suspension Clause. They explain that in St. Cyr, "the Supreme
Court . . . essentially treated . . . [the Suspension Clause's presup-
position of the existence of habeas], together with the clause's con-
cern about unwarranted suspension, as precluding the possibility
that the writ would be unavailable, whether through congressional
action or inaction-unless, of course, Congress had properly in-




The writ was part of the common law in 1789. Its protection in
the Suspension Clause requires Congress confer jurisdiction to
hear writs of habeas corpus on the judiciary or else suspend the writ
33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 555, 581 (2002).
197. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95.
198. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,82 (1866).
199. Id.
200. See Ekeland, supra note 19, at 1496 (writing that the Milligan court held "a
court may still issue a writ of habeas corpus when Congress has suspended the
writ").
201. 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). See also MIAN, supra note 24, at 166-97 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has power to issue writs of habeas corpus in the absence
of statute due to its common law ability to do so prior to 1789).
202. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304 n.24 ("Marshall's comment expresses the far more
sensible view that the Clause was intended to preclude any possibility that 'the
privilege itself would be lost' by either the inaction or the action of Congress.")
203. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 56, at 2051.
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if it is a time of rebellion or invasion °4 Because Congress in the
DTA and MCA has attempted to remove the judiciary's habeas ju-
risdiction without meeting the requirements of the Suspension
Clause, Congress is prohibited from suspending the writ by ousting,--, • •. • 105
federal courts ofjurisdiction.
2. The Differences Between the GITMO Detainees and the
Eisentrager Detainees Constitutionally Entitle the GITMO Detainees
to Challenge Their Detention According to the Sliding Scale of Rights
in Eisentager
Under Eisentrager's framework for analyzing the claim that
aliens possess constitutional rights, the GITMO detainees are con-
stitutionally entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Although Eisen-
trager appears to reject the availability of any constitutional rights
for aliens who lack presence or property in the United States, in re-
ality, Eisentrager should be read narrowly. 206
First, even though aliens within the United States may be sub-
ject to deportation and detention if they are enemy aliens, nothing
in Eisentrager supports the proposition that the government can in-
definitely hold without process those accused of being enemy
207aliens. In fact, Eisentrager supports the contrary conclusion in the
case of the GITMO detainees. It is important to note that Eisen-
trager does not sanction the ability of government to do as it wishes
during a time of war. While discussing the diminishing rights of
the enemy alien during a time of war, the Eisentrager Court noted:
[t]he resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to
summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a
'declared war' exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom
from Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of
war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the
Alien Enemy Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have
been determined, courts will not inquire into any other is-
204. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
205. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2 (4th ed.
2003). A discussion of whether the requirements of the Suspension Clause are
met in the case of the GITMO detainees is outside the scope of this article, but it
appears plain that they are not. No rebellion or invasion threatens the United
States.
206. See Justice Kennedy's characterization of Eisentrager's holding in Rasul,
discussed supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (referring re-
peatedly to "enemy aliens," not alleged or accused enemy aliens).
2008] 5185
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sue as to his internment."'
According to this language, Eisentrager itself expects that courts
will play a role in determining whether an individual accused of be-
ing a resident enemy alien is in fact an enemy alien.
Second, there are several key factual distinctions between the
Eisentrager petitioners and the GITMO detainees, which could lead
to a different result than in Eisentrager.209 First and most impor-
tantly, the Court in Eisentrager did not have to address how to pro-
ceed when the alleged enemy aliens challenge their classification as
enemy combatants because the petitioners in Eisentrager had been
found guilty during a full military commission trial.1 Their trial by
military commission was justified under the traditional basis for
convening military commissions. 2 1 Thus, they had no argument
that they should not have been classified as enemy aliens. On the
other hand, the GITMO detainees present an entirely different
situation from that in Eisentrager. As the Court in Rasul pointed
out:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager de-
tainees in important respects: They are not nationals of
countries at war with the United States, and they deny that
they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against
the United States; they have never been afforded access to
any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of
wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been
imprisoned in territory over which the United States exer-
cises exclusive jurisdiction and control. 
12
In essence, the GITMO detainees are not conclusively enemy
combatants and, therefore, should not be placed at the low end of
Eisentrager's sliding scale of rights, as the petitioners in Eisentrager
were.
Supporters of Eisentrager claim that it has recently been af-
firmed by the Supreme Court. However, while the Supreme Court
has followed Eisentrager on two recent occasions, neither requires
Eisentragers application to the GITMO detainees. In United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court rejected the contention that the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution applied to the "search and seizure
208. Id. at 775 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)) (emphasis
added).
209. See generally Sholar, supra note 21, at 676-78.
210. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777, 778.
211. See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
212. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004).
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by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country., 21  The Court relied on Eis-
entrager, explaining that application of the Fourth Amendment to
the defendant's claim "would have significant and deleterious con-
sequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its
boundaries."214 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court cited Eisentrager for
the proposition that "certain constitutional protections available to
persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of
our geographic borders.
2 1 5
Although these cases cite Eisentrager, they do not require the
conclusion that Eisentrager bars the habeas petitions brought by the
GITMO detainees. First, Zadvydas dealt with the government's abil-
ity to indefinitely detain aliens the government declared deport-
216able. The Court's cite to Eisentrager is best understood as an ar-
ticulation of the sliding scale of rights, not as an inflexible rule that
aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States may
never bring a habeas petition in federal courts in the absence of
217statutory authority. Second, Verdugo-Urquidez appears to rely on
Eisentrager's identification of "deleterious consequences" if constitu-
tional rights are extended beyond the territorial borders of the
United States. As related to GITMO detainees, no one contests
the government's ability to hold alleged enemy combatants for a
short period of time to determine whether they are, in fact, enemy219
combatants. I propose a six-month delay before the GITMO de-
tainees' habeas corpus rights are exercisable. Such a delay will alle-
viate any deleterious consequences to the government of permit-
220ting the GITMO detainees to petition for habeas corpus.
Factual comparisons aside, the plain language of Eisentrager
does not apply to GITMO detainees. The Eisentrager Court held
that "the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security
or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien
enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the
213. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
214. Id. at 273.
215. 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
216. See id. at 682.
217. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (applying its holding
in Zadvydas to aliens the INS had deemed inadmissible, thereby extending further
the protections against indefinite detention to those who were not entitled to be
in the United States).
218. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
219. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-20 (2004).
220. See infra Part III.B.
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United States."22' This does not, on its face, affect the right of al-
leged enemy combatants to challenge that designation. Moreover,
nothing in Eisentrager permits indefinite government detention
simply because the government claims an individual is an enemy
222combatant. All Eisentrager does is establish that an individual who
is an enemy combatant and who lacks presence and property within
the United States does not have the constitutional right to chal-
lenge in civil court their conviction by military commission for vio-
lating the laws of war. It does not give the government carte
blanche over detainees who may or may not be enemy combatants.
Additionally, the Court in Eisentrager undercuts the argument that
aliens without presence or property in the United States lack all
constitutional rights. The Eisentrager Court actually decided the
merits of the case, holding that the Eisentrager petitioners were
223properly tried by military commissions. The inference can then
be made that the Court's decision in Eisentrager was governed by
the Court's belief that the Eisentrager petitioners were rightfully de-
tained, and not by the rule that no alien without presence or prop-
erty in the United States was entitled to constitutional rights.
Based on the differences between the Eisentrager petitioners
and the GITMO detainees, the GITMO detainees should receive
higher placement on the sliding scale of rights articulated in Eisen-
trager. Accordingly, the Constitution requires that Congress con-
fer jurisdiction to hear writs of habeas corpus brought by GITMO
225detainees. Subject only to a minor limitation discussed in Part
III.B, Congress may not deprive the GITMO detainees of their abil-
ity to challenge their detention via habeas corpus without running
226afoul of the Suspension Clause Because the conditions required
227for suspension of the writ are not present, the MCA and DTA are
unconstitutional insofar as they strip the courts ofjurisdiction.
B. Separation of Powers Permits Minor Limitations on the GITMO
Detainees' Habeas Rights, Despite the Importance ofJudicial Review
This subpart balances the importance of the writ of habeas
221. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (emphasis added).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 777-81.
224. See supra notes 209-223 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part III.A.1.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 205.
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corpus and judicial review with the deference generally shown the
Executive during a time of war. It sets up a framework by which the
GITMO detainees' access to the writ of habeas corpus can be pro-
tected without infringing on the Executive's ability to wage the War
on Terror.
As discussed above, Congress's attempt to curtail the GITMO
228detainees' habeas rights violates the Suspension Clause. But not
every detainee in the world is entitled to challenge his or her de-
tention via a writ of habeas corpus. 229 Some are legitimately de-
tained for violations of the laws of war.2' ° Additionally, Hamdi signi-
fies that bodies other than courts may be appropriate tribunals to
determine whether individuals are enemy combatants. 231 Despite
the importance of judicial review in the U.S. constitutional system,
certain limitations on the GITMO detainees' habeas rights are
permissible because of the deference generally shown the Execu-
tive during a time of war according to separation-of-powers princi-
ples.
The Constitution contemplates a system of government made
up of three coequal branches: the executive,judicial, and legislative
232
branches. This separation of powers is "essential to the preserva-
tion of liberty" and each branch has an important role in ensuring
233that the others do not violate the Constitution. s' The writ of ha-
beas corpus provides the judiciary with an essential check on ex-
ecutive power; it allows challenges to the propriety of executive de-
tention. Indeed, the writ was developed in England primarily for
215this purpose. 5 Blackstone explained that:
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of
this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of
228. See supra Part III.A.2.
229. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (1950) (holding
that alien enemies do not have a right to the writ of habeas).
230. See id.
231 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
232. U.S. CONsT. art. I-III.
233. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (noting that it
was "the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our po-
litical scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate
Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty").
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. Schatz & Horst, supra note 185, at 582 ("The Constitution vests the Su-
preme Court with authority to wield the judicial power of the United States, and
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any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whom-
ever he or his officers thought proper . . . there would
soon be an end of all other rights and immunities .... To
bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his es-
tate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and no-
torious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the
alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to
jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a
less public, a less striking, and therefore a more danger-
ous engine of arbitrary government. 2
6
Under our constitutional system, the judiciary is obligated to
curb abuses of executive power through the exercise of judicial re-
view.237 Blackstone understood that the judiciary was an important
check on executive power, and the Supreme Court from very early
on understood that to be its function as well. By exercising the ju-
diciary's essential functions under the Constitution, to serve as a
check on executive and legislative power and to declare the su-• 231
preme law of the land, the Court ensures that Blackstone's fear of
an arbitrary government does not come true.
The argument that the GITMO detainees should not receive
the right to habeas corpus because of executive war powers is un-
founded. 23 9 First, even during a time of war, the Executive's author-
240ity to act is not entirely unfettered. Courts retain the duty to re-
236. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *131-33.
237. SeeAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 256 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (stating that an "essential function of the federal courts" is to "pro-
vide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of
the supreme law of the land"); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757
(1996) (noting that "the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not
impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties"); Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
238. See supra note 237.
239. Jay Alan Bauer, Detainees Under Review: Striking the Right Constitutional Bal-
ance Between the Executive's War Powers and Judicial Review, 57 ALA. L. REv. 1081,
1095-98 (2006) (noting that courts generally defer to executive authority during
times of war, but do not and should not abdicate the right ofjudicial review).
240. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (The
war power "is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing
of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve
the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties."); Bauer, supra note 239, at 1084 ("It is repugnant
to the fundamental concepts of American liberty to allow the executive branch to
act without allowing the judiciary to determine whether those actions are a consti-
tutional exercise of executive power. This is true even when the executive is acting
5190 [Vol. 34:5
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/8
INDEFINITE DETENTION
view the constitutionality of executive action, as illustrated by nu-
merous prior cases. Second, the situation faced by the GITMO
detainees is especially ripe for judicial oversight given that the prac-
tice of indefinite detention and trial by military commission raises
242separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order. Further-
more, the enemy combatant label is less clear-cut in the War on
Terror than it is during a conventional war because the War on
243Terror faces a movement, not a nation-state. An easy example of
this lack of clarity is that in a conventional war, soldiers wear uni-
forms, while combatants in the War on Terror may not. Given this
lack of clarity, total deference to the Executive is inappropriate.
But some deference to the Executive is appropriate to ensure
that the GITMO detainees' exercise of their habeas rights does not
under the auspices of its powers as Commander-in-Chief."); Sarah M. Riley, Com-
ment, Constitutional Crisis or Dijti Vu? The War Power, the Bush Administration and the
War on Terror, 45 DuQ. L. REv. 701, 713-14 (2007).
241. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866). Eisentrager itself recognized that executive power is not unfet-
tered. Despite holding that the petitioners did not have the constitutional right to
habeas corpus, the Court went ahead and inquired into the propriety of subjecting
the petitioners to trial by military commission. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 777-81 (1950). See also Riley, supra note 240, at 714 ("No matter what the na-
tional crisis, the President [cannot] usurp Congress's lawmaking abilities, nor...
replace the Judicial Branch with military tribunals that did not promise the same
guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights.").
242. AsJustice Kennedy wrote in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:
Trial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the
highest order. Located within a single branch, these courts carry the risk
that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive
officials without independent review. Concentration of power puts per-
sonal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Con-
stitution's three-part system is designed to avoid.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (in-
ternal citations omitted). See also supra Part II.B.2.d.
243. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (discussing the more in-
definite nature of a War on Terror as compared to a war against a nation state).
See also Huskey, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that the War on Terror is a "new kind of
war" where the government "can assert all of the powers associated with the laws of
war, but abide by none of its constraints"); Riley, supra note 240, at 730-32; Sholar,
supra note 21, at 663 (noting that "[w]ho is and who is not a combatant in a con-
flict has become a matter of subjective judgment based on incomplete informa-
tion"); Id. at 696-98 (discussing the "indefinite nature of warfare in the modern
world"); Melissa M. Tomkiel, Enemy Combatants and Due Process: TheJudiciary's Role
in Curbing Executive Power, 21 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 411, 443 (2006);Jenni-
fer A. Lohr, Note, A "Full and Fair" Trial: Can the Executive Ensure it Alone? The Case
For Judicial Review of Trials by Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 396 (2005) (noting that the nature of warfare and national
security has changed "from a practical standpoint").
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infringe on the Executive's ability to conduct the War on Terror.'
44
As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion in Rasul,
"there is a realm of political authority over military affairs where
the judicial power may not enter."2 45 In evaluating how much def-
erence is owed the Executive during a time of war, the judiciary
should both ensure the rule of law and take account of the
"changed reality" of war.246
There are problems associated with judicial review of executive
action during a time of war. One concern is that judicial micro-
management will displace the 'judgments of military commanders
in ways that will hamper the military effort. ,24' Another concern is
that the availability ofjudicial review at all will prompt lawsuits that
"divert commanders from their real business."'2 4
To address these concerns, I propose that the GITMO detain-
ees should have to wait six months after their initial detention in
United States' custody before exercising their habeas rights. 14' This
right should be limited to those who the government contends are
enemy combatants and who have not been declared prisoners of
war and are not subject to trial by military commission for violating
the law of war.15 These limitations would ensure that the GITMO
detainees' exercise of this right does not hamper the Executive's
ability to conduct the War on Terror.151 This proposal would also
allow the government time to determine whether to classify new
GITMO detainees as prisoners of war and to review whether new
GITMO detainees are indeed enemy combatants. Thus, the "flood
of lawsuits" would be contained.
Limiting the GITMO detainees' habeas rights in this way also
shows the proper respect for the traditional role of military com-
244. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (recognizing the
need to give the Executive some latitude in handling the war on terrorism).
245. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See
also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
246. Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 555, 556 (2005).
247. David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act: On Striking
the Right Balance, 101 AM.J. INT'L L. 344, 358 (2007)
248. Id. at 358-59.
249. Of course, the exact waiting period is not important. Six months is used
here because that was the period of time deemed permissible to detain individuals
pending deportation in Zadvydas.
250. See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
251. Because the government would be able to detain an individual for a short
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missions. As the Court explained in Hamdan, the use of military
commissions is accepted in certain circumstances, most notably
when the detainee is accused of violating the laws of war. 152 If a
GITMO detainee is properly subject to trial by military commission,
then that detainee's right to habeas is practically eliminated due to
much lower placement on Eisentrage's sliding scale of rights for
aliens. 53
By upholding Eisentragers denial of habeas to those convicted
of law of war violations, and by requiring the GITMO detainees al-
leged to be enemy combatants to wait six months after their initial
detention before exercising their habeas rights, the judiciary con-
tinues to show proper deference to the Executive.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT INDEFINITELY
DETAIN INDIVIDUALS IN A SO-CALLED JURISDICTIONAL BLACK HOLE
This article demonstrates that GITMO detainees are constitu-
tionally entitled to the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their de-
tention at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. After explaining
the importance and background of the writ of habeas corpus, it
concludes that the writ of habeas corpus is a constitutional right,
protected by the Suspension Clause, which applies to the GITMO
detainees. However, a minor limitation on this right is appropriate
due to the traditional deference shown the Executive during times
of war.
Any conclusion to the contrary creates a zone of government
activity without judicial oversight. This is untenable given the Con-
stitution's emphasis on an individual's right to liberty unless deten-
tion is justified. Habeas corpus traditionally has protected this lib-
erty interest from unjustified executive interference and that it
does so for the GITMO detainees is entirely appropriate.
252. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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